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Abstract 
Data purpose is a central concept to modeling privacy requirements for information systems. Existing 
purpose-centric approaches for privacy protection have mainly focused on access control. The 
problem of ensuring the consistency between data purpose and data usage has been under-addressed. 
Given the lack of practical purpose-centric solutions, we argue that a grounded understanding of the 
underlying concepts of data purpose and usage is fundamental to modeling privacy requirements. In 
recognition of an existing “privacy rights” framework, this paper develops an ontological grounding 
of data purpose and usage that can be used to understand their implications on fundamental privacy 
rights for modeling privacy requirements for information systems. 
Keywords: Privacy, Privacy Rights, Privacy Requirements, Data Purpose, Data Usage. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In today's service dominated global economy privacy is valuable. The rapid development of online 
services has presented a trend in developing the Internet into a network of services to facilitate and 
optimize our everyday life and business, e.g., email service, chat service, employment service, banking 
service, travel service, social networking service, etc. Social networking websites are one of the fastest 
growing online service providers in recent years. These websites provide a platform to facilitate 
communication, exchanging and sharing of information among users and third parities. Supported by 
the Internet infrastructure, socialization on social networking websites is free of location and time 
limitations. To facilitate socialization and gain reputation in the competitive market, these networking 
websites offer innovative services to users. However, while these services provide attractive features 
they also introduce high-level privacy infringement risks to their users due to the richness of the 
information exchanged and shared, and the high degree of user interconnectivity.  
The problem of potential privacy infringements has two key aspects:  
1. User’s awareness: the user lacks awareness of information use control. In other words, risk of 
privacy infringements can occur due to the user not being made aware to monitor and control 
their personal information. 
2. Service functionality: the user lacks ability of information use control because the service 
platform does not provide adequate functionalities for fulfilling privacy requirements of 
information use. In other words, risk of privacy infringements can occur due to the user not 
being able to monitor and control their information. 
From an operational perspective, awareness and functionality reflect the problem of “who can do 
what” – i.e., i) the user’s awareness of “who can do what to information about me”; and ii) 
functionality of the service that allows users to monitor and control “who can do what” to them.  
Given that privacy is personal-dependent, privacy status of the information under consideration is 
justified by the user self. In other words, the rationality of a privacy infringement claim needs to be 
justified based on the user’s requirements. From an information system’s perspective, the operational 
problem is a system requirement problem, i.e., the service platform provides functionality to allow 
users to manipulate information. To develop functionalities to satisfy users’ desires, it is essential to 
understand users’ intensions about using their information – a problem referred to as “data purpose”, 
which leads to “use limitation” of the data to achieve privacy protection of the data – two privacy 
protection principles identified by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) (OECD 2009), namely Purpose Specification Principle (PSP) and Use Limitation Principle 
(ULP).  
A number of purpose-based approaches for privacy protection have been proposed (Byun et al. 2005; 
Staden and Olivier 2007). However, there is still insufficient support for users to control their personal 
information – which has been demonstrated in practical contexts, typically, by privacy breaches 
continually reported in mainstream media. For example, Moses (2009) and France-Presse (2007). This 
phenomenon highlights the need to review and enrich the semantics of data purpose as one of the 
fundamental privacy requirements. In information systems, the ability to accommodate rich semantics 
for effectively controlling information use requires effective representations of data. Motivate by such 
needs, this paper studies two relevant OECD Privacy Principles – i.e., the PSP and the ULP – with a 
focus on data purpose specification for implementing mechanism for users to control data usage in 
information systems. We conduct the study within an existing framework built on three fundamental 
privacy rights namely choice, consent and control (Williams 2009; Chen and Williams 2010a, 2010b).  
In the next section we present a motivating example, identify the problem and propose a path to the 
solution. Section 3 interprets the meeting point of the principles and the fundamental rights at focus. 
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Section 4 studies basic properties of the principle. Section 5 grounds privacy requirements based on 
the findings. Finally, Section 6 discusses findings and identifies future work.  
2 PROBLEM DOMAIN 
Social referral, in which one connects to another by a third party referral, is an important social 
channel to bridge social entities. In social networking systems (SNSs), such referral is implemented 
using recommendation techniques. We refer to this type of referrals as social recommendations (SRs).  
The problem domain of this paper is scoped in SRs, due to: i) social networks provide a rich social 
infrastructure for information sharing; and ii) SRs in these networks are rich resource for investigating 
information privacy issues to derive privacy requirements for information systems’ development. This 
section presents a SR scenario, analyzes privacy issues arose from the scenario and proposes a path to 
the solution.  
2.1 A Social Recommendation Example 
Mary received a “People You May Know” (PYMK) list from her social network on MySN site, 
allowing her to send a message to people on the list. She was surprised to find many school friends she 
had lost contact with on the list. However, she also felt compromised because she saw those who share 
the same type of profession as her were on the list. She was disappointed not being able to keep her 
professional information disjoint from her personal social network and to keep her away from those 
professionals she did not want to network with, because she believed if she saw others' information 
they could also see hers. Her concern was confirmed by a friending request (i.e., requests to be added 
as a friend) from her manager the next day. Mary joined another social network on RealSN which 
allowed her to choose who could know her existence in the network (i.e., she could choose who she 
would not be recommended to) and she believed that she could now stay away from her manager. 
However, she did not know one of her best RealSN friends, Phoebe, was her manager's daughter who 
shared online experience with her father. As a result Mary received a friending request from her 
manager on RealSN.  
2.2 The Problem  
Mary lost her privacy on the PYMK list because she did not have chances to choose:  
1. whether to be listed on the PYMK list presented to who - e.g., she wanted to be listed and 
recommended to those who share the same interests with her except her manager;  
2. who can or cannot see her on the list if she wanted to be listed - e.g., Phoebe can see her but her 
manager cannot; and  
3. what those who can see her on the list can do about her - e.g., Phoebe cannot pass her 
information onto her manager without her permission.  
These problems constitute a problem of “who can do what to information about me” (WCDW) – a 
problem of fundamental rights, i.e., Mary did not have sufficient rights to do what she expects. 
Relevant works (Williams 2009; Chen and Williams 2010a, 2010b) have modelled these rights into 
three categories namely choice, consent and control. Fundamental to the privacy problem is identified 
as the right to choose the kind of consent to enact control: WCDW (Chen and Williams 2010b). In 
other words, one should be granted sufficient rights in choosing the “what” and the “who” to consent 
such that one can control own information. This “right” model is referred to as 3CR model (Chen and 
Williams 2010b). 
Within the 3CR model, “consent” is a central right. One’s right to grant permissions for others to use 
their information dominates the information’s privacy status. Without permissions information cannot 
be used. In other words, information privacy control is upon permissions. The personal-dependency 
property of privacy justifies the appropriateness of permissions on user’s intensions. Therefore, an 
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understanding of data purpose is crucial for permission decisions. On the other hand, construction of 
appropriate permissions requires sufficient and relevant options – i.e., the right to choose what to 
consent as the ability to construct permissions. Both MySN and RealSN fail to provide functionality 
for Mary to exercise her rights of choice, consent and control.  
In summary, the privacy problem of collaborative information systems is the requirements of three 
fundamental rights (i.e., the 3CR) w.r.t. the problem of WCDW and “purpose” as the central concept 
of requirements.  
2.3 A Path to Solution: Privacy Requirements as The First Step 
The first step to implement information systems is to develop system requirements. To realise privacy 
protection in information systems privacy requirements need to be developed. Methodologies and 
guidelines for privacy requirements development are required. The set of principles for privacy 
protection identified by the OECD is a good candidate because they represent as far as possible a 
global consensus. The PSP and the ULP are relevant principles; however, they do not provide detailed 
guidelines for requirements development to address the operational problem namely “who can do what 
to me” (WCDW). In an attempt to bridge this gap, in this paper we study the semantics of these two 
principles, and enrich them to interpret the 3CR model.  
3 INTEGRATING PSP&ULP INTO 3CR: THE MEETING POINT 
As defined by the OECD, the PSP restricts use of the collected data to the purposes of collection, and 
the ULP enforces data to be used for specific purposes for which consent has been given. How can 
these two principles be semantically accommodated in the 3CR model? In other words, how can the 
PSP and the ULP interpret three fundamental rights as privacy requirements for information systems 
in which users can exercise these rights to preserve their privacy? Semantically,  
• The PSP concerns the consistency of the purpose of data usage and the purpose for which they 
were collected. This concern of consistency captures the notion of choice and consent, allowing 
the principle to be interpreted as users’ rights from choice to consent.  
• The ULP concerns the consistency between data usage and the purpose of usage. This concern of 
consistency captures the notion of consent and control, allowing the principle to be interpreted as 
user’s rights from consent to control. 
This integration can be demonstrated in the context of social recommendations, where both principles 
play a dominating role. Typically,  
• The PSP restricts relationships because information can only be collected for the purpose of 
sending social recommendations. This raises important questions regarding the nature of 
consenting to recommendations. For example, in consenting to a recommendation does the user 
also consent to spin-off recommendations that might include business propositions like purchasing 
a product. 
• The ULP enforces a social relationship can only exist for the purpose of social interactions. For 
example, a religious relationship is for religious interactions and not for trading interactions.  
By this interpretation, two principles intersect at the central right “consent”. A comprehensive 
interpretation of three rights therefore requires binding two principles coherently to centrally position 
consent in the 3CR model, such that control of the operational issue – the WCDW - can be enacted.  
4 INTERPRETING PROPERTIES OF PRINCIPLES 
Unless properties that constitute the backbone of the principle are understood, coherent binding 
between principles cannot be achieved. This section studies the key concepts that conceptualize (i.e., 
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capture status of) constitutional properties of the principles, namely data purpose for the PSP and data 
usage for the ULP. 
4.1 Data Purpose 
By restricting the use of the collected data to the purposes of collection, the PSP holds properties of 
data and purpose. Data has status. Data purpose shows expectations for specific status. It implies 
permissions for actions on the data object to maintain the expected status. A data object can have 
multiple purposes, coexist or optional, to indicate expectation of its status.  We use the term “validity” 
to bridge expected and unexpected status in response to satisfaction of data purpose.  We say a data 
status is valid when it meets a set of purposes expectation of the same data object. On this notion of 
validity, a data status is valid only when its status satisfies the expectation of the purpose outcome. 
Such expectations are “safeguarded” by permissions for actions on the data object. Thus, purpose 
implies permissions.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Grounding of PSP  
  
Figure 2. Grounding of ULP 
A data object can have a one-to-zero, one-to-one, or one-to-many relation to purpose. One-to-zero 
means there is no any purpose bound onto the data object. One-to-one refers to a single purpose is 
expected for the data object. One-to-many signifies more than one purpose is expected for the data 
object, where these purposes can be optional or coexist to indicate an expectation. Required by the 
purpose to serve expectations to reach expected status, permissions are multiple. An expectation 
requires relevant permissions to “safeguard” conditions for an expected achievement. E.g., Mary and 
Phoebe maintain a connection for communication about travel related matters. Upon agreement, they 
maintain their relationship for teaming-up i) a culture-exploring trip in China before 2010; ii) an 
adventure in South Africa before 2010; iii) a driving trip in Tasmania after 2011; and iv) a 
backpacking trip in Europe before 2010 or after 2011. They intend to build four separated teams and 
consent to different channels different information.  
In summary, the PSP has properties namely data and purpose, where the former concerns validity and 
status, the later concerns expectations and permissions.  
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4.2 Data Usage 
By enforcing data to be used in compliance with specific purpose, the ULP holds the properties of 
data and usage. As mentioned, data has status. Data usage can be restricted by certain constraints, 
which can be permissions under which use of data can be undertaken. Constraints can also include 
obligations indicated by commitments or responsibilities associated with permission grants.  
Usage restricted by constraints can be interpreted by “purpose of use”, i.e., the purpose of the data 
usage. Usage effects data validity through change of status.  
In summary, the ULP has properties namely data and usage, where data is the object concerned by the 
PSP and usage concerns constraints and purpose.  
5 GROUNDING PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS 
We argue privacy requirements for collaborative information systems are threefold: i) data purpose 
and data usage binding, ii) 3CR accommodation, and iii) implication consideration. In this section we 
present a grounding of requirements from these three aspects (Sections 5.1-5.3). Then, based on the 
findings we propose a set of Codes of Practice in Section 5.4. 
5.1 Data Purpose and Data Usage Binding 
Purpose of using a data object (referred to as “use purpose”) can be derived from the usage property 
(Figure 2.) of ULP, however, this property does not “self-contain” a power to enforce the required 
data purpose (Figure 1.) and ensure a consistency between data purpose and use purpose. Thus, a 
binding between PSP and ULP, semantically, is essential to achieve the consistency.  
  
Figure 3. Binding Data Purpose and Data Usage 
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Figure 1. shows that purpose aims at the status, whereas it is a “product” of usage in Figure 2. A 
consistency between the status in Figures 1&2 can be seen as an indication of a successful binding 
between two principles. The status, in Figure 1, is “safeguarded” by permission of purpose; while in 
Figure 2 it is by constraints which include permissions and obligations (if any). Thus, there is also a 
consistency problem between permissions associated with purpose and permissions under which usage 
can be carried out. Figure 3. depicts the consistency problem between data purpose and data usage. A 
coherent binding between the PSP and the ULP needs to address the consistency problem in Figure 3.  
5.2 3CR Accommodation 
Three factors namely expressivity, extensibility and adaptability have been identified as a fundamental 
problem to accommodate the 3CR in information systems. In addition, rights of consent and control 
also concern factors of fidelity and adequacy, respectively (Chen and Williams 2010a). We refer to 
these factors as the 3CR representation criteria.  How the PSP and the ULP can be interpreted such 
that detailed guidelines can be established to develop comprehensive 3CR requirements for better 
privacy management? In Section 3 we identified the relation between the principles and the 3CR 
namely PSP as from choice to consent and ULP as from consent to control. In the following we look 
at fundamental dimensions of each property identified in Section 4 and reason about a set of fine-
grained guidelines for exercising the 3CR with the PSP and the ULP.  
The PSP on Choice&Consent  
The PSP interprets choice and consent by two core concepts, namely data object and data purpose, to 
provide users sufficient and meaningful choice options for constructing their consent. 
• Data Object 
The nature of a data object is described by size, volume, amount, granularity and structure. Of 
these elements, the structure plays a dominant role in having choice to set consent on the object’s 
size, volume, amount and granularity. Specifically, this concerns  
o Having choice to construct consent for any components of a composite data object – a 
reflection on the adaptability criterion. 
o Having choice to construct consent on the level of detail in hierarchies, when hierarchical 
structures are involved – a reflection on the expressivity, extensibility and adaptability criteria. 
Scenarios concerned include: 
 The data object or a component of the data object is a hierarchical object (i.e., a 
hierarchy of objects is considered as a whole for the data object or for the component). 
E.g., relationship information as a data object, e.g., there is already a set of 
hierarchical relationships and the relationship of interest can be located in the 
hierarchy, or the relationship is established at a higher abstraction level of agreements, 
e.g., trading. 
 The data object can be linked or mapped to a hierarchical object (assume mapping 
mechanism is available). E.g., a location related concept “Ultimo_Australia_2007” 
can be mapped to a set of location concepts at different levels of detail - i.e., “Ultimo-
>Sydney->NSW->Australia”.  
• Data Purpose 
Data purpose aims at data objects. With its backbone at permissions, data purpose concerns 
fulfilment of expectation to maintain the data object at a desired status. Specifically, this concerns  
o Having choice to provide consent to any of the conditions that remains the validity of a data 
object – a reflection on the expressivity and adaptability criteria.  
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o Having choice to construct complex composite purposes with different conditions on a data 
object – a reflection on the expressivity and adaptability criteria. E.g., the validity of a data 
object D at time t1, t2, and t3 can be in the scenarios below: 
 at time t1, D can only be used for purpose p1, and at time t2 used for p1 and p2 and not 
p3 where p1 includes p3; 
 at time t1, D can only be used for either purpose p1 or purpose p2 and not for both 
together, and at time t2 must be used for p2 and p3 where p1 includes p3; or 
 D can only be used for both purpose p1 and purpose p2, or after time t1 used for either 
purpose p1 or purpose p2 and not for both together. 
o Having choice to construct purpose at different abstractions.   
E.g., 
 
Data object: The relationship between Mary and Phoebe. 
Purpose: Mary and Phoebe to maintain a relationship for communication on travel related topics, with 
          four specific purposes:  
i). a culture-exploring trip in China before 2010  
                            ii). an adventure in South Africa before 2010  
                           iii). a driving trip in Tasmania after 2011 
                           iv). a backpacking trip in Europe before 2010 or after 2011 
Expectation: i). communication for travel relationship development. 
                ii). both Mary and Phoebe’s professional space and non-specific-trip-related personal space will     
             not be touched by their communications. “Touched” means any information about the   
           subject of interest is affected.  
                   iii). four teams will be built at different period of times. 
Permission:  i). communications must be related to a specific trip.  
                    ii). relationship can be used for a specific trip referral. 
 
Figure 4. An Example 
The ULP on Consent&Control 
The ULP interprets consent and control by two core concepts, namely usage and constraint, to provide 
users sufficient power to control personal information based on the consent they provided – i.e., use 
constraints to restrict usages. As mentioned,  
• Consent concerns the criterion of fidelity – on which that is satisfied, data purpose can be derived 
by data usage and permissions implied by the derived purpose will be consistent with permissions 
under which usage can be carried out. In other words, the criterion of fidelity requires usage to be 
valid only under the permissions associated with purpose for the same data object. 
• Control concerns the criterion of adequacy – on which that is satisfied by reflections on 
constraints that require permissions and obligations. Permissions may not be adequate to restrict 
usages to achieve expected results. For example, communications/referrals under permissions in 
Figure 4. do not guarantee a result that a professional space is untouched. Phoebe shared 
information about their trip to China with her father, asking for his advice because he lived in 
China during 2007 and 2008. Although she mentioned Mary only when she talked about the trip, 
the way she described Mary “told” her father that Mary was his employee. If Phoebe committed to 
the obligation in Figure 4., she might have avoided an identifiable description about Mary when 
she talked to her father.  
Adequacy is difficult to measure. Even if Phoebe was aware of her obligation, how could she 
know what to avoid in order not to “touch” Mary’s professional space - if she did not know 
sufficient information about Mary’s profession (which Mary considered as her privacy)? We 
attempt an implication-driven understanding to approach this problem in the next sub-section.  
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5.3 Implications 
Positioning data purpose in the centre, we learn the groundings of data purpose associated with data 
usage from a semantic perspective on a conceptual implication-based flow. Figure 5. graphically 
describes the flow of implications starting from the central concept “purpose”. Semantically, a data 
purpose is intended for a data object, which has a status and stakeholders who established the purpose. 
There are two types of purposes for a data object: purpose for creating a data object and purpose for 
maintaining the data object’s life upon its creation, namely creation purpose and existence purpose, 
respectively.  
 
Figure 5. Ontological Grounding of Data Purpose and Usage 
Data objects exist for use – to distinguish uses of data for purpose other than existence, we refer to this 
type of uses as actions of exercising data. Collection is generally required before an exercise action 
can be carried out. Therefore, the existence purpose can be divided into exercise purpose and 
collection purpose categories. A satisfaction of collection purpose is a prerequisite for satisfaction of 
exercise purpose. However, it cannot guarantee a satisfaction of exercise purpose from the perspective 
of a collection.  A data object allows to be collected means, to a certain extent, it is allowed to be used. 
In other words, a data object having collection purpose attached implies it can be used under 
permissions associated with the purpose. Permissions determine the extent of usages, which are 
actions that require actors to carry obligations (if any) and will produce outputs upon completion. 
Usage determined from permissions implied by collection purpose may not be consistent with the 
exercise action intended by the exercise purpose, if the collection purpose was not clearly associated 
with the exercise purpose.  
Categories 
• Permission consistency implication  
Since action results can have implications on the data status that existed before the action was 
carried out, implications can be arose from the consistency between i) the permission of usage that 
can be derived from the purpose of collection, and ii) the permission of exercise that could be 
created without or incorrectly associating with the purpose of collection. Since usage can result in 
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new data status, inconsistency between them can hinder an achievement of an expected data 
status. We refer to implications due in this cluster as permission consistency implication. 
• Connection implication  
Implications can be introduced by permissions due to the connection between actors of the usage 
and stakeholders of the data object. Since connections between entities can consist of complex 
relationships, the network of actors and stakeholders has an impact on the data status via action 
performance. We refer to implications due in this cluster as connection implication. 
Dominations and Constitutions 
Central to the connection implication is the problem of relationship, which can also affect 
permissions’ effect because actor’s position in the network has potential to introduce implications 
through information propagation, positively or negatively, from an information usage perspective. 
This reasoning uncovers “relationship” as a hidden property to the PSP and the ULP. It also indicates 
relationship as an important component to constitute permissions for binding two principles to 
approach the adequacy problem in control. Based on this understanding, we can constitute permission 
as: 
<usage, actor, effectiveTimePeriod> 
Actors as social entities are difficult to be defined by identities due to their public availabilities (i.e., 
their public openness). They can, however, be reached conceptually by their connections to the 
stakeholder.  
One connects to another directly or indirectly. The connection between an actor and a stakeholder 
indicates the connectivity between them. Constitutions of the connectivity therefore can be utilized for 
data purpose decision and realization such that negative implication can be minimized. Grounding the 
notion of relationship by connectivity (RBC) (Chen and Williams 2010b), we learn: 
• Connection end: A connection end is one of the two connected entities under consideration.   
E.g., in the Figure 5., the actor and the stakeholder are two connection ends.  
• Connecting entity: A connecting entity is one of the entities between two connection ends are 
referred to as connecting entities.  
• Connection degree (Chen and Williams 2010b): A connection degree indicates the distance 
between a connecting entity and a connection end, reflecting in the number of entities 
(including the connecting entity under consideration) away from the connection end.  
E.g., if A connects to B, and B connects to C, then A is said to be 2 degrees away from C, i.e., 
the connection degree between A and C is 2.  
In practice, multiple paths connecting two entities often exist. In such cases, the connection degree of 
two entities is the length of the shortest path between them, because it reflects an entity’s ability to 
connect to another economically. However, when considering privacy, the length of a connection path 
is not a dominating factor in assessing a relationship; rather, the types of relationships involved in the 
path have more impact on one’s privacy status. Such complexity can be described by RBC - in the 
above example, if A and B are colleagues, B and C are friends, and A and C do not know each other, 
then the RBC from A to C is described as: 
• a path: “a work connection at degree 1 followed by a friend connection at degree 2”; or,  
• a structured format: {(“work”,1),(“friend”,2)}.  
In Mary and Phoebe’s scenario, the notion of RBC can be used to better construct permissions and 
obligations to achieve better information privacy preservation. For example, Mary can give permission 
to those who do not have connection to her professional space – e.g., using “not {(“work”,1)}” to 
indicate permissions not giving to those belong to this RBC cluster. It might be ambiguous if Phoebe 
does not know anything about Mary’s professional information. Mary therefore needs to give away 
some privacy – however, she does not need to tell Phoebe all the details. She can require Phoebe to 
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commit to “ ‘work’ is restricted to medicine-related areas only”. By this specification, Phoebe knows 
that she cannot tell her father about Mary’s work related information since he works for a 
pharmaceutical company.  
On the other hand, social entities involved in a relationship can be at different levels of abstraction. 
For example, a relationship can be individual-to-individual, individual-to-group where the individual 
can belong to the group, or group-to-group where one group can belong to another group or they can 
overlap or be completely disjoint.  In describing a relationship to her company as “medicine-related”, 
Mary is able to avoid giving unnecessary information away in order to construct her consents. This 
shows a way to flexibly specify level of details of a relationship in the RBC.  
In summary, implications are due to permission consistency and connection’s connectivity, which are 
“chained up” by relationship complexity. These implications highlight our interpretation of “data 
purpose” supports the central privacy problem: “who can do what to information about me?” As can 
be seen from Figure 5, the actor (“who”) performs the action/usage (“do”) to the data object (“what”) 
of the stakeholder. Having sufficient choice, consent and control rights to express desires (“purpose”) 
and restrict personal (“stakeholder’s”) information (“data object”) used by others (“actor”) is the path 
to better information privacy management.  
5.4 Codes of Practice 
Based on the findings above, we define the following Codes of Practice (CoP) as a set of guidelines 
for purpose-centric requirements for developing 3CR information systems. 
Data Object (DO) 
[DO:COMPOSITION]  
For a decomposable data object, choice options for each component and mechanisms for constructing 
consents to the chosen options must be provided.  
[DO:ABSTRACTION]  
For a data object with hierarchical structure involved, or can be linked or mapped1 to some nodes of at 
least one hierarchy, choice options for each node of the hierarchy and mechanisms for constructing 
consents to the chosen options must be provided.  
Data Purpose (DP) 
[DP:EXISTENCE]  
The existence purpose, if any, for the data object must be specified with the type of purpose (i.e., 
exercise or collection). Choice options and mechanisms to specify the purpose must be provided. 
[DP: EXISTENCE_ COMPONENT]  
For a decomposable data object, existence purpose for each component, if any, must be specified. 
Choice options to specify the purposes must be provided.  
[DP: EXISTENCE_ PERMISSION]  
For a data object that exists for some purpose, the permissions expected by the purpose must be 
specified.  
[DP:VALIDITY]  
For a data object that exists for some purpose, the validity of the data object must be specified against 
the existence purpose. Choice options for expectations and permissions, and mechanisms for 
constructing consents to the chosen options must be provided. 
                                            
1 This requires mapping mechanisms. However, details about mapping techniques are not in the scope of this paper. 
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 [DP:COMPOSITION]  
For a data object that exists for multiple purposes, choice options to specify coexisting purposes and 
optional purpose, and mechanisms for constructing consents to the chosen options must be provided.  
[DP:ABSTRACTION]  
For any data purpose with hierarchical structure involved, or can be linked to or mapped to some 
nodes of at least one hierarchy, choice options for each node of the hierarchy and mechanisms for 
constructing consents to the chosen options must be provided. 
Data Usage (DU) 
[DU:PURPOSE] 
The purpose for which a data usage intends for the data object must be specified. 
[DU:PERMISSION]  
The permissions under which a data usage can be carried out must be specified. 
[DU:ACTOR] 
The type of actor must be specified by their relationship by connectivity to the stakeholder of the data 
object. 
Consistency Check (CC) 
[CC:PURPOSE] 
The codes of [DP:EXISTENCE] and [DU:PURPOSE] of the same data object must be consistent on 
content and format. 
[CC:PERMISSION] 
The codes of [DP:PERMISSION] and [DU:PERMISSION] of the same data object must be consistent 
on content and format. 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
Information privacy concerns focus on “who can do what to information about me” (WCDW) (Chen 
and Williams 2010b). Within the existing legal and sociological framework, fundamental privacy 
rights have been identified as choice, consent and control (Williams 2009; Chen and Williams 2010a, 
2010b) and a 3CR model (Chen and Williams 2010a) has thus been proposed as a basic framework for 
building privacy-friendly information systems.  
Data purpose is a central concept to model privacy requirements. How data purpose can be modelled 
to utilize data usage such that the user can manage their WCDW requirements? Given that existing 
purpose-centric approaches lack satisfaction for user’s privacy rights, this paper studies the concepts 
of “data purpose” and “data usage” that are central to two relevant OECD Privacy Principles namely 
Purpose Specification Principle and Use Limitation Principle, aiming for privacy requirements for 
information systems in which users have the ability to exercise their the fundamental privacy rights 
within the 3CR model.  
This grounding study ontologically interprets data purpose and data usage from an information 
system’s perspective. It not only analyses privacy requirements, but also addresses their representation 
problems – i.e., the 3CR representation criteria (Section 5.2).  As a result, a set of Codes of Practice is 
proposed as a set of general guidelines for further development of detailed guidelines in domain-
specific application areas.  
This research has initiated an ontological approach to grounding the fundamental privacy problem for 
building robust collaborative information systems (CISs). It is ontologically promising; however, still 
at its infant stage. We aim for a comprehensive grounding study of the privacy problem to gain a 
fundamental understanding to build an operational environment for privacy management in CISs. In 
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this paper we focus on the static aspects of data purpose. Future work will include a deep study of 
dynamic aspects of the proposed approach and formalism of requirements towards robust CISs.  
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